A ‘Cultural Heritage Loss Claim’ (‘CHLC’) may arise where e.g. a state grants mining/industrial farming/land development/oil concessions – in the ‘ancestral lands’ of an ‘indigenous people’.
For example – Kichwa Indigenous Community of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ser.C) No.245 (2012), in which the court found Ecuador liable, holding that the obligation to consult is a general principle of International Law, thereby establishing a universal precedent about the responsibilities of states towards their indigenous peoples.
Arguably this principle extends to claims for restitution and repatriation.
To bring a case, an allied State – e.g. a BRICS member?, must sponsor the ‘Indigenous claim’, and both States must have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.
Both States involved must also be party to an international treaty that explicitly prohibits racial/cultural discrimination, and they must have a dispute over its interpretation or application.
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) is the most prominent treaty used at the ICJ to address Cultural Heritage Loss.
The State granting the concessions must have recognized the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction (e.g., through an Article 36(2) Declaration under the ICJ Statute) or have consented to a special agreement to let the ICJ settle the dispute.
An Article 36(2) declaration (often called the ‘Optional Clause’) is a formal statement by a state accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
By depositing this declaration with the UN Secretary-General, a nation agrees in advance to let the ICJ resolve its legal disputes with any other state that has made the same commitment.
Once two disputing countries have active declarations, one can bring the other to court ipso facto (by the fact itself), without needing a custom, case-specific treaty
Because only States have standing before the ICJ, the home State of the Indigenous group (if different from the exploiting State), or a sympathetic ‘third-party State’ – must take up the claim.
Because the ICJ primarily focuses on inter-State disputes, claims regarding Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) or Indigenous land rights are more commonly brought to regional human rights tribunals.
Mediation of CHLC’s will be discussed in my forthcoming book – the ‘Mediation of Cultural Heritage Disputes’ – see the page of the same name at www.carlislam.co.uk.
‘The Indivisibility of Land, Identity, and Artefacts’ – The Sarayaku ruling explicitly tied the duty to consult to the protection of cultural identity and communal property under Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights. The Court noted that the unauthorized destruction of sacred sites violated the community’s worldview and intangible heritage. Because indigenous cultural artefacts are manifestations of that same cultural identity and are often inseparable from ancestral spiritual practices, the obligation to consult logically applies when states make legal or administrative decisions affecting those objects. The Court ruled that states must consult indigenous peoples on ‘any legislative or administrative measures that affect them directly’. A state’s decision to negotiate, deny, or execute the repatriation of a historical artifact constitutes an administrative/legal measure directly impacting that community’s cultural survival. Under this framework, states cannot unilaterally decide the fate of indigenous objects without a formal, good-faith consultation process designed to achieve Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC).
Treaty law and soft law frameworks support extending this principle. (i) UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), Article 11 and Article 12 explicitly state that indigenous peoples have the right to the restitution of their cultural, intellectual, religious, and spiritual property taken without their FPIC. (ii) The ILO Convention 169, which was heavily relied upon in Sarayaku, mandates consultation on any measures affecting indigenous peoples’ cultural integrity.
Despite the conceptual alignment, directly enforcing Sarayaku to compel the repatriation of artefacts faces significant practical hurdles: (1) ‘Extraterritoriality and Jurisdictional Gaps’ – Sarayaku governs a state’s obligations to indigenous peoples within its own borders. Most high-profile repatriation claims involve artefacts held by foreign museums or states (e.g., European institutions holding African or Indigenous American objects). The IACtHR lacks jurisdiction to compel a non-member state to repatriate items. (ii) ‘State Sovereignty v. Indigenous Ownership’ – International cultural property law (like the 1970 UNESCO Convention) operates primarily on a state-to-state framework. When an artefact is repatriated, it is typically returned to the government of the origin state, not directly to the specific indigenous group. Sarayaku is weaponized precisely at this stage. It argues that when a state receives or negotiates for a returned artifact, the state is legally obligated to consult the domestic indigenous community regarding its custody and future management, rather than absorbing it into a state-run national museum.