Applying Francis Fukuyama’s methodological framework in his seminal works – ‘The Origins of Political Order’ and ‘Political Order And Political Decay’, to armed conflict, Mediation can shift the focus from short-term ceasefires to building durable political institutions.

A Fukuyama-led Mediation strategy rejects superficial fixes.

It views peace not just as the absence of war, but as the deliberate, sequential engineering of state capacity, legal boundaries, and public accountability.

Fukuyama argues that a stable political order requires a balance of three pillars:

(i) ‘The State’ – Centralised power capable of enforcing laws and security.

(ii) ‘Rule of Law’ – Binding rules that apply equally to elites and citizens.

(iii) ‘Accountability’ – Mechanisms (formal or moral) ensuring the government serves the public.

How does this ‘Analytical Framework’ Apply to Mediation?

(i) Prioritising State Capacity Over Quick Elections:

‘The Problem’ – Peacemakers often urge the holding of democratic elections immediately after a ceasefire.

‘Fukuyama’s View’ – Elections without a functional state apparatus lead to chaos or renewed war.

‘Mediation Shift’ – Peace talks must first focus on building a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.

‘Action’ – Disarm militias and build a neutral, meritocratic bureaucratic infrastructure before transitioning to politics.

(ii) Designing Rule of Law to Restrain the Victor:

‘The Problem’ – Peace deals often collapse because the stronger party ignores the agreement once fighting stops.

‘Fukuyama’s View’ – The Rule of Law must exist independently of raw political power to prevent tyranny.

‘Mediation Shift’ – Mediators must institutionalise legal constraints that protect the losing side and minorities.

‘Action’ – Create independent judiciaries and constitutional protections that the executive branch cannot easily alter.

(iii) Managing Patrimonialism and Corruption:

‘The Problem’ – Post-conflict states frequently descend into patronage networks where leaders enrich their own tribes or factions.

‘Fukuyama’s View’ – Human nature naturally defaults to ‘patrimonialism’ (favouring family and friends) unless blocked by strong institutions.

‘Mediation Shift’ – Power-sharing agreements must be designed to decay over time.

‘Action’ – Avoid permanent ethnic quotas in government. Transition from ‘re-patrimonialised’ warlord politics to a merit-based civil service.

(iv) Diagnosing Political Decay:

‘The Problem’ – Institutions created during a peace process can rigidify and fail to adapt to changing societal needs.

‘Fukuyama’s View’ – Political decay happens when institutions fail to adapt to new social actors and economic realities.

‘Mediation Shift’ – Mediators must build flexible frameworks rather than static, rigid treaties.

‘Action’ – Include formal review clauses and mechanisms for civil society to influence the political system as the nation heals.

However, what we are witnessing in the UK and throughout the western world is the opposite: (i) the undermining of the Rule of Law; (ii) dismantling of the independent Civil Service; (iii) removal of scrutiny and accountability for politicians; and (iv) unconstrained corruption by a small entrenched elite – ‘Patrimonialism.’ Cumulatively and over time, this may result in a collapse of ‘Political Order.’